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Going to the Clerk’s Office and We’re Not 
Going to Get Married 
Alicia F. Blanchard 
13 U. MASS. L. REV. 100 
ABSTRACT 
Same-sex marriage is a controversial topic subject to great debate. The Supreme Court 
in 2015 federally recognized the legality of same-sex marriages in Obergefell v. 
Hodges. Despite this ruling, some people looked for any reason to denounce the 
holding. Perhaps none were more vocal than those who rejected same-sex marriage on 
the basis of their religious tenets. Miller v. Davis provided people who were morally 
opposed to same-sex marriage a platform to support their concerns grounded in a First 
Amendment right to freedom of religion. The question is how far does one’s freedom 
of religion extend? Does freedom of religion give one the right to deny to others their 
federally recognized rights? Many have sought to define the boundaries separating 
church and state; however, those boundaries remain malleable and oftentimes hard to 
enforce, presenting a challenge to those seeking to define them. This comment 
explores the bounds of freedom of religion and analyzes the rights and protections 
associated with marriage. Specifically, this comment suggests a balancing test for 
determining when a government official may exempt themselves from issuing 
marriage licenses based on their religious tenets. Broadly, the test determines when 
religious exemptions are appropriate. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Denied . . .  
Because they wanted to get married.1 
Denied . . . 
Because someone felt what they were doing was wrong.2 
Denied . . . 
Because two civil liberties are in conflict . . .3 
And no one knows which will win or if both will lose.4 
n June 26, 2015, April Miller and Karen Roberts traveled to 600 
Main Street in Morehead, Kentucky on a day they hoped to 
remember forever.5 They soon discovered they would remember the day 
forever, but for an entirely different reason than they hoped.6 In addition 
to Ms. Miller and Ms. Roberts, three other couples — Kevin Holloway 
and Jody Fernandez, Barry Spartman and Aaron Skaags, and Shantel 
Burke and Stephen Napier — traveled to or called the Rowan County 
Clerk’s office in hopes of getting marriage licenses to solemnize their 
relationships.7 All four couples were denied this right.8 They had gone 
to the County Clerk’s office after the Supreme Court came out of the 
judicial closet with its decision Obergefell v. Hodges, which federally 
recognized the right for same-sex couples to marry.9 These couples were 
denied their right to a marriage license because the county clerk, Kim 
Davis, could not find it in her conscience to grant same-sex couples 
marriage licenses.10 Further, she instated a policy where no marriage 
                                                 
1 See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 930 (E.D. Ky. 2015). 
2 See id. at 929. 
3 See id. at 930. 
4 See id. 
5 Kim Davis, KIM DAVIS COUNTY CLERK ROWAN COUNTY, KENTUCKY, 
http://rowancountyclerk.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/JU9M-MM7V]; see also Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 929. 
6 See Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 929. 
7 See id. Two couples were same-sex, and two couples were heterosexual. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See id. 
O 
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licenses would be issued out of her office.11 Davis claimed she could 
not abide by the ruling in Obergefell as it violated her Apostolic 
Christian beliefs.12 
The four couples argued that Davis violated their Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process right as established in Loving v. Virginia, and 
extended by Obergefell to include same-sex couples under its 
protection.13 The Obergefell ruling caused a stampede of opinions on 
same-sex marriage to come to an already turbulent forefront by 
providing a soapbox for many officials and individuals to profess their 
own judgments on how the case should have been decided. 14 
For many years, same-sex rights and equality questions were within 
the specific domain of the states, but with reactions to the Defense of 
Marriage Act,15 and popular opinion in favor of more liberal policies, 
the federal government began testing the waters of regulating LGBTQ 
rights.16 While the federal government began the whirlwind process 
toward LGBTQ equality, fierce advocates protested against same-sex 
marriage for religious reasons.17 Governors, attorneys general, mayors, 
and clerks were appalled as their morals and religious beliefs were tested 
by the Obergefell decision.18 Many sought ways to avoid its 
enforcement, thus frustrating the balance between those enforcing the 
law and the actual law.19 
Citizens are guaranteed the right to freedom of religion under the 
First Amendment, which affirms that the government shall not involve 
itself in matters of or inhibit the free exercise of religion.20 Opponents 
claim the Obergefell decision does exactly that.21 Kim Davis used this 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 See id. at 932. 
13 See id. at 934; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
14 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
15 See generally 1 MASS. PRAC., FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 19:16 (4th ed.). 
16 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, 
BACKLASH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 9 (2013). 
17 See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Most States to Abide By Supreme Court’s Same-Sex 
Marriage Ruling, but . . ., CNN (June 30, 2015, 8:20 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/29/us/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/ 
[https://perma.cc/6HPQ-9RLG]; see also Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 930. 
18 See McLaughlin, supra note 17; see also Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 932. 
19 See McLaughlin, supra note 17; see also Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 932. 
20 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
21 See Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 932. 
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as her excuse for not issuing any marriage licenses in her county.22 
Miller v. Davis gave people who were morally opposed to same-sex 
marriage a platform to bring forth their concerns.23 Many challenged the 
Obergefell decision, and supported Kim Davis by alleging that 
federalizing same-sex marriage violates the First Amendment.24 
Specifically, challengers claimed the Obergefell decision resulted in a 
violation of their freedom of religion.25 
Freedom of religion is a fundamental tenet of the Bill of Rights.26 
However, multiple times throughout history laws have come into 
conflict with religious beliefs, and thus posed a challenge to one’s 
freedom of religion.27 The critical question remains: How far does a 
person’s freedom of religion extend?28 Are citizens excused from 
following a law they believe conflicts with their religious beliefs?29 Or 
are they forced to follow a law despite their religious beliefs?30 Thomas 
Jefferson and others sought to define the boundaries separating church 
and state; however, those boundaries remain malleable and oftentimes 
hard to enforce.31 
Section I of this comment will give a brief history of the separation 
of church and state, and how the courts and leading figures have 
attempted to define its boundaries throughout history. Section II will 
give a synopsis of the evolution of same-sex marriage law in the United 
                                                 
22 See id. 
23 See McLaughlin, supra note 17; see generally Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 932. 
24 See Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 938-39. Kim Davis argued that the directive to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples was a violation of her First Amendment 
right; specifically, it burdened her right to freedom of religion by forcing her to 
act in contradiction to her closely-held religious beliefs. Id. 
25 Id. 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
27 Anthony M. Lise, Bringing Down the Establishment: Faith-Based and 
Community Initiative Funding, Christianity, and Same-Sex Equality, 12 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 129, 131 (2008). There has been a departure from Thomas 
Jefferson’s notion of a strict separation of church and state. In recent times, the 
government has involved itself in some ways in various religious practices and 
organizations. Instead of the strict separation touted by the founders, there are 
now a series of tests to determine when the government has gone too far in its 
involvement in religion. Id. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
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States. Section III will discuss the aftermath of the Obergefell decision 
and provide a case study of Miller v. Davis to highlight the issue of 
government officials who claim faith-based rationales for opposing 
same-sex marriage in their official capacity. Section IV will use Miller 
v. Davis and other historical and current cases to outline a balancing test 
courts should use to determine whether government officials have the 
right to claim an exemption from enforcing the law based on their right 
to freedom of religion. Section V will conclude with an analysis of the 
potential future effects of this test. 
II.  SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Religion and governmental functions have been inextricably linked 
for the entirety of U.S. history.32 In the early sessions of the Continental 
Congress, convened to discuss aspects of the Revolutionary War and the 
burgeoning government, religion was embraced as part of the delegates’ 
daily activities.33 Despite these initial religious undertones in 
government, tensions rose when religion was incorporated into 
government processes.34 For instance, in 1785, Virginia proposed the 
adoption of a state religion.35 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson 
vehemently opposed this idea as it interfered with the citizenry’s 
freedoms.36 James Madison believed, “[r]eligion then of every man 
must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the 
right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”37 Thomas 
Jefferson, too, wrote on the establishment of religion in Virginia: 
                                                 
32 JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: 
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 57-60 (2000). 
33 See id. The First Continental Congress began each session with a prayer. The 
Second Continental Congress used government funds to pay chaplains to offer 
prayers at the beginning of each session and to serve in the military. Further, the 
Continental Congress endorsed days of fasting and prayer. 
34 See Lise, supra note 27, at 141. 
35 See id. 
36 Id. at 141-42. 
37 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in 
Virginia (June 20, 1785), http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2016) [https://perma.cc/KA7Q-ER49]; see also Lise, supra note 27, at 
141; DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES 8 
(2003). 
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No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any 
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor 
shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in 
his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account 
of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall 
be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their 
opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in 
no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil 
capacities.38 
Despite Madison and Jefferson’s opposition to religious entanglement 
with government proceedings, the Framers of the Constitution viewed 
religious liberties as beyond the purview of the federal government, and 
within the states’ authority.39 
Following the Revolutionary War, from May 25, 1787, to 
September 17, 1787, state delegates convened to develop a Constitution 
for the newly liberated states.40 There were a few general references to 
religion in the Constitution, but no explicit statement of the separation 
of church and state.41 The Constitution was, in effect, “Godless.”42 
Religious matters were left for the states to decide.43 On September 28, 
1787, the Continental Congress unanimously voted to approve the 
Constitution.44 It was then sent to the states to garner the minimum nine-
                                                 
38 Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (Jan. 16, 
1786), http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-
sources/virginia-act-establishing-religious-freedom (last visited Dec. 2, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/B9DK-7TG5]; see also Lise, supra note 27, at 141; CONKLE, 
supra note 37, at 9-10. 
39 See WITTE, supra note 32, at 61. Eleven of the thirteen states had already 
incorporated religious liberty clauses into their state constitutions. Rhode Island 
and Connecticut did not write a new constitution after the Revolutionary War, but 
retained their colonial charters which included religious liberty clauses. The 
United States Constitution did not initially include a religious liberty clause, and 
in the absence of a federal law the state had sovereign authority. 
40 Id. at 60. 
41 Id. at 60-1. The Constitution made several references to religion, all of which were 
generic in nature. The Preamble speaks of “Blessings of Liberty.” Article VI 
states, “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States.” The date at the conclusions also makes 
reference to “the Year of our Lord.” 
42 Id. at 61. 
43 See id. Before the Constitution was even written most of the states already had 
detailed policies concerning religious liberty. 
44 See id. at 63. 
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state approval required to ensure its ratification.45 Tension existed after 
the Constitution was ratified because it did not include a bill of rights 
enumerating an individual’s rights and liberties.46 Many of the initial 
framers thought a bill of rights was unnecessary to ensure individual 
liberties for it was thought to be impossible to create a comprehensive 
list of those liberties.47 Ultimately, the states ratified the Constitution, 
but only on the condition that there would be a Bill of Rights.48 
Seven states proposed content to be included in the Bill of Rights, 
six of which submitted content concerning religious liberty.49 The Bill 
of Rights was ratified on December 15, 1791.50 Within the newly 
ratified Bill of Rights, the Framers incorporated a religious liberty 
clause into the First Amendment.51 The First Amendment states, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”52 The First Amendment 
religious clause can be broken down into two sub-clauses: a Free 
Exercise Clause and an Establishment Clause.53 
A. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states, “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”54 This 
clause serves three distinct purposes: to prevent state or government 
sponsorship of religion; to prevent sending government funds to 
                                                 
45 See id. 
46 Id. at 61-3. 
47 See id. As James Wilson noted at the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, “[A] 
bill of rights is neither an essential nor a necessary instrument in framing a system 
of government, since liberty may not exist and be as well secured without it. But 
it was not only unnecessary, but on this occasion it was found impracticable – for 
who will be bold enough to undertake to enumerate all the rights of the people? – 
and when the attempt to enumerate them is made, it must be remembered that if 
the enumeration is not complete, everything not expressly mentioned will be 
presumed to be purposely omitted.” Id. at 63. 
48 See id. New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and North Carolina’s proposed 
language would eventually be combined into the modern language of the First 
Amendment. 
49 Id. at 63-4. 
50 Id. at 72. 
51 See id. There were twenty drafts of the First Amendment before the final text was 
adopted. 
52 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
53 See CONKLE, supra note 37, at 9-10. 
54 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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religious institutions; and to protect involvement of governmental 
bodies in religious activity.55 The clause impliedly creates a “wall of 
separation between church and state.”56 Courts recognize that while 
there cannot be a complete separation of church and state, there need to 
be some demarcated boundaries.57 Three tests are used to determine 
those boundaries.58 These tests are the Lemon Test, the Endorsement 
Test, and the Coercion Test.59 
The Lemon Test, derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, uses a three-
prong approach to determine whether a statute infringes on religious 
liberty.60 The first prong is that the statute must have a “secular, 
legislative purpose.”61 The second prong is that the primary effect of the 
statute must not further or limit religion.62 The third prong is that the 
statute must not “foster an excessive government entanglement with 
                                                 
55 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). 
56 Id. The Establishment Clause refers to the First Amendment text, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” (citing U.S. CONST. 
amend. I). 
57 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (1973) 
(finding that “total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some 
relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable.”). Id. 
58 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 603. 
59 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 577 (1992). 
60 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; David W. Cook, The Un-Established Establishment 
Clause: A Circumstantial Approach to Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 11 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 71, 79-80 (2004) (citing Waltz v. Tax Comm’n of New 
York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)). 
The court extrapolated the first two prongs of the Lemon Test from Board of 
Education v. Allen, and the third prong from Waltz v. Tax Common of New York. 
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
61 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. Lemon v. Kurtzman dealt with the Rhode Island 1969 
Salary Supplement Act, which allowed for a 15% salary supplement to teachers 
in non-public schools provided they refrain from teaching religious courses. 
Additionally, it dealt with the 1968 Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, which allowed the superintendent to propose secular 
classes. Citizens brought these suits claiming that the classes were a violation of 
the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court found that the 
Rhode Island and the Pennsylvania Acts violated the third prong of the Lemon 
Test by encouraging too much entanglement between religion and state, and thus 
were violations of the Establishment Clause. See generally id. 
62 See id. 
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religion.”63 The Lemon Test is the most widely-used Establishment 
Clause test.64 
The lesser-used Establishment Clause tests are the Endorsement 
Test and the Coercion Test.65 The Endorsement Test comes from Sandra 
Day O’Conner’s concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.66 Endorsement 
exists when a reasonable person observing a public display would 
perceive it as conveying governmental support for a certain 
religion.67Additionally, the Coercion Test, stemming from Lee v. 
Weisman, determines whether the state used coercive measures to 
enforce a religion.68 
                                                 
63 See id. 
64 See Dean v. D.C., No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *4 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 
2, 1992); see also Matthew E. Feinberg, Esq., And the Ban Plays on . . . for Now: 
Why Courts Must Consider Religion in Marriage Equality Cases, 10 U. MD. L.J. 
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 221, 235 (2010). The Supreme Court heavily 
relies on the Lemon test in Establishment cases; however, it may expand, limit, or 
abandon a prong of the test depending on the circumstances. Ultimately though, 
the Lemon Test is the “law of the land.” Id. 
65 See Feinberg, supra note 64, at 234. 
66 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 668 (1984); Cook, supra note 60, at 82-83. 
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island included a nativity 
scene in its annual public Christmas display. The District Court of Rhode Island 
enjoined the city from using the display. Pawtucket residents and members of the 
Rhode Island branch of the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit claiming 
that the display violated the Establishment Clause. On appeal, the judgment of the 
District Court was affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court found 
Pawtucket did not violate the First Amendment Establishment Clause because the 
display did not imply government support of a particular religion. Lynch, 465 U.S. 
at 671-726. 
67 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668. 
68 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). This case was brought by a public 
school student and her father to discontinue benedictions at graduation. The 
principal of a middle school invited a rabbi to recite a nonsectarian prayer at the 
graduation. The District Court of Rhode Island granted the injunction, and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held in favor of the student and 
her father. The Court reasoned that the principal’s choice to include a prayer and 
choice of religious figure was attributable to the state as he was the principal of a 
public school. Prayer in public schools is subtly coercive because it creates 
pressure for students who may not understand the difference between respecting 
a religious practice and participating in conduct that may result in the endorsement 
of a particular religion. The Court ultimately determined that the Constitution 
prohibits the government from coercing others to participate in religion. Id. at 
577-603. 
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The Establishment Clause tests are difficult to apply to same-sex 
marriage cases.69 Parties who brought same-sex marriage cases under 
the Establishment Clause have been few and unsuccessful;70 however, 
there is a growing trend that supports the application of Establishment 
Clause Tests to marriage ban laws and policies.71 In the future, the 
questions to be asked are whether same-sex marriage bans act to 
promote a religious preference or whether there are any secular purposes 
for them.72 
B. Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
The First Amendment includes a Free Exercise Clause, which states 
that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”73 This removed from 
Congress power over an individual’s opinion, but gave Congress 
authority over “actions which were in violation of social duties or 
subversive of good order.”74 To bring a cause of action under the Free 
Exercise Clause, a person must demonstrate that a law “improperly 
burdened” a religious belief.75 
There are three different standards of review for Free Exercise 
cases.76 The first level of review is the lowest level of scrutiny or the 
                                                 
69 See Feinberg, supra note 64, at 232-36. 
70 See Dean v. D.C., No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *4 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 
2, 1992). The plaintiffs were a same- sex couple who claimed that the court’s 
interpretation of same-sex marriages violated their Due Process rights. They also 
claimed that the court violated the Establishment Clause by relying on the Bible 
in their interpretation of marriage. The court applied the Lemon Test and found 
the law did not advance religion simply because it happened to coincide with 
religious ideals. The court dismissed this charge as being frivolous. Id. at *1-8. 
71 See Feinberg, supra note 64, at 237. 
72 See id. The argument against laws and policies that ban same-sex marriage for 
violating the Establishment Clause is that preventing same-sex marriages 
advances or inhibits religion, which in turn violates the Lemon Test. See id. at 
242. 
73 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
74 See CONKLE, supra note 37, at 9-10. This refers to the First Amendment Free 
Exercise Clause, “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .” (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
75 See WITTE, supra note 32, at 119. A party bringing a claim under the Free Exercise 
Clause must have proper standing and cannot bring a political question. 
76 See id. 
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rational basis review.77 A challenged law will be upheld if the 
government can prove that the law is in “pursuit of a legitimate 
governmental interest,” and the law is “reasonably related to the 
interest.”78 The intermediate scrutiny test requires heightened 
scrutiny.79 Under this test, a court will generally uphold a law if it 
pursues an “important or significant governmental interest,” and is 
“substantially related to that interest.”80 The last test is the highest level 
of scrutiny, known as strict scrutiny.81 Under this test, the court will 
uphold a law if it is in “pursuit of a compelling or overriding 
governmental interest,” and is “narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.”82 
The Supreme Court used a rational basis level of scrutiny when it 
heard its first Free Exercise case in 1879 in Reynolds v. United States.83 
In Reynolds, the Court faced a conflict derived from the intersection of 
freedom of religion and the law.84 A man who was tried for polygamy 
in violation of a Utah statute claimed that the practice was part of his 
Mormon religion.85 The Court reasoned that Utah had constitutional 
authority to enact a law banning polygamy; therefore, the court held 
Mormons were not exempted from the statute.86 
The Free Speech portion of the First Amendment adds an extra layer 
of protection to the Free Exercise Clause.87 In addition to the religious 
clauses, the First Amendment gives people the right to speak without 
                                                 
77 See id. at 121-24; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 145 (1878); 
Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389–90 (1918); Employment Div., Dep’t of 
Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–13 (1997) (These cases all utilized the rational basis 
test for causes of action brought under the Free Exercise Clause.). 
78 See WITTE, supra note 37, at 121-24. 
79 See id. at 121-23. In Cantwell v. Connecticut the Supreme Court raised the 
heightened level of scrutiny and ruled that there were certain areas of religion the 
government could not regulate unless they involved criminal actions including 
religious beliefs, worship, and assembly. 
80 See id. at 122. 
81 See id. at 122-24; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
82 See WITTE, supra note 37, at 122. 
83 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 145 (1878). See, e.g., CONKLE, supra 
note 37, at 7; WITTE, supra note 32, at 121-24. 
84 See CONKLE, supra note 37, at 7. 
85 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145-47.  
86 Id. at 165-66. 
87 See CONKLE, supra note 37, at 106. 
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fear of government retribution.88 The Free Speech Clause protects an 
individual’s own religious speech from discrimination.89 
C. Modern Separation of Church and State: 
The modern view of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause is 
grounded in the pursuit of religious equality and non-discrimination.90 
Further, many statutes and policies apart from the Free Exercise Clause 
are imbued with the value of non-discrimination.91 With regards to 
Establishment Clause cases, the Lemon Test is the primary mode in 
which laws are tested to determine if they violate the First 
Amendment.92 In an increasingly homogenized world, the challenges 
surrounding freedom of religion become more complex.93 
In a 2006 speech, “On Faith and Politics,” Barack Obama spoke on 
the issue of evolving demographics in the United States and how that 
phenomena affects the separation of church and state.94 The United 
States is comprised of people of many different faiths, and a certain 
degree of separation of church and state is necessary to prevent 
sectarianism.95 Obama offered a hypothetical on the dangers of 
sectarianism, by imagining a United States with only Christians. 
Amongst Christians there are numerous divisions of belief, and he used 
the following words to emphasize the dangers of those divisions: 
Which passages of Scripture should guide our public 
policy? Should we go with Leviticus, which suggests 
slavery is ok and that eating shellfish is an abomination? 
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How about Deuteronomy, which suggests stoning your 
child if he strays from the faith? Or should we just stick 
to the Sermon on the Mount - a passage that is so radical 
that it’s doubtful that our own Defense Department 
would survive its application?96 
Sectarian principles cannot govern because democracy prefers 
compromise amongst all religious beliefs via the promotion of certain 
universal principles from dominant religions.97 The roots of the majority 
of dominant religions do not allow for compromise when it comes to 
their core tenets and beliefs.98 Many religions offer “edicts” that must 
be followed, but public policy cannot be governed in the same way.99 
Obama offered the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac to illustrate this 
principle.100 Abraham was ordered by God to sacrifice his son, but at 
the last moment an angel appeared telling Abraham he passed God’s test 
of devotion.101 Obama then told the story as if it were happening in 
today’s world, for if a person saw a man raising a knife to a child, one 
would hope that they would call the police.102 Not everyone will 
recognize their God or gods within such limited and biblically-based 
frames of reference. That is because not everyone will have the same 
edicts stemming from their religious beliefs.103 Public policy must be 
constructed based on what is evident to all, not just what is evident to 
those few who fall in line with a certain system of beliefs.104 
Obama returned to the theme of the dangers of sectarianism in his 
remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast: 
The United States is one of the most religious countries 
in the world – far more religious than most Western 
developed countries. And one of the reasons is that our 
founders wisely embraced the separation of church and 
state. Our government does not sponsor a religion, nor 
does it pressure anyone to practice a particular faith, or 
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any faith at all. And the result is a culture where people 
of all backgrounds and beliefs can freely and proudly 
worship, without fear, or coercion. . . .105 
In an increasingly multicultural nation, Obama saw value in the 
freedom of religion and found that it is best upheld through the 
separation of church and state because it allows for people of all 
religions to practice however they wish, free from duress.106 
III. HISTORY OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Homosexuality has a long and discordant history of discrimination 
under the American legal system.107 After the Civil War, sub-cultures 
began to grow that included homosexuality and gender-bending ideals, 
leading many states to enact sodomy laws to counter these sub-
cultures.108 Conversely, there were no federal laws explicitly 
prohibiting these sub-cultures, but there were laws whose side effects 
limited the rights of individuals within certain homosexual sub-
cultures.109 These laws included the Comstock Act, prohibiting the 
mailing of all obscene materials, and the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930, 
prohibiting customs from allowing obscene materials to enter the 
country.110 Immigration laws also prevented those with homosexual 
tendencies from entering the country in its prohibition of “sexual 
degenerates.”111 
By 1960, all states had enacted sodomy laws prohibiting sex 
between male same-sex partners.112 These laws were used as a 
justification for a blanket discrimination policy against homosexuals.113 
However, popular media increasingly publicized homosexuality 
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throughout the 1960s,114 resulting in a growth of pro-LGBTQ 
activism.115 In 1962, the American Law Institute condemned sodomy 
laws in its Model Penal Code.116 Despite same-sex activism growing in 
popularity, public opinion still weighed heavily against 
homosexuality.117 
The 1970s saw a rise in gay rights organizations.118 As gay rights 
and activism gained esteem, homosexual couples sought to gain legal 
recognition for the first time.119 Many same-sex couples seeking 
marriage licenses used the precedent set in Loving v. Virginia to their 
advantage.120 The Loving court found unconstitutional a ban on 
interracial marriage when it determined that marriage is a fundamental 
right subject to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses.121 However, the lower courts were not persuaded by 
the argument that Loving should be extended to same-sex marriage.122 
They reasoned that miscegenation was distinguishable from same-sex 
marriage as it applied to racial discrimination, which was based on an 
immutable characteristic, and not discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, which many deemed a lifestyle choice.123 
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In the decades following, increased access to information about 
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”) led to an ardent push 
for legal recognition of same-sex marriage.124 By 1988, approximately 
46,000 people had died from AIDS, two-thirds of whom were 
homosexual men.125 The median age of death was thirty-six.126 Many 
of these individuals were not prepared for death, and had not even 
considered end-of-life decisions, such as estate planning or medical 
decision-making surrogates.127 Further, many benefits did not pass on 
to same-sex partners such as health insurance or deeds to property.128 It 
became increasingly apparent that the benefits associated with marriage 
would be beneficial to those individuals whose partners were suffering 
from HIV/AIDs, thus adding fervor to the fight for recognition of same-
sex marriage.129 
There are two arguments for same-sex marriage springing from the 
Fourteenth Amendment.130 The first argument uses the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which deems marriage a 
fundamental right of an individual.131 Proponents of same-sex marriage 
argue that because the Supreme Court does not allow the government to 
institute bans on marriage based on race, imprisonment or delinquency 
in paying child support, it cannot ban same-sex couples from 
marriage.132 The second argument is that same-sex marriage bans 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.133 
Proponents asserted that banning same-sex marriage is sex 
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discrimination on its face, and thus violates the Fourteenth Amendment 
requiring a strict scrutiny analysis that had not yet been applied to same-
sex marriage cases.134 
Nineteen ninety-six marked one of the first successes for proponents 
of legalizing same-sex marriage.135 Three same-sex couples in Hawaii 
were denied marriage licenses in 1990.136 They sought injunctive relief 
from a Hawaiian statute preventing legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage.137 In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny 
standard and ruled it presumptively unconstitutional to discriminate 
against same-sex marriage.138 In 1996, on remand, the court found that 
same-sex couples should have the right to marry.139 Unfortunately, in 
1999 the decision was reversed in light of an amendment to the 
Hawaiian Constitution banning same-sex marriage.140 
President Bill Clinton signed into law the Defense Against Marriage 
Act (“DOMA”) in 1996, which severely hindered actions to legalize 
same-sex marriage.141 DOMA interprets the word “marriage” to mean 
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife in all federal rulings and statements.142 
DOMA was aimed at depriving same-sex couples of the federally 
guaranteed rights allotted to heterosexual couples.143 Eventually, 
DOMA was found unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor as 
violating the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.144 
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In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex 
marriage in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.145 The decision 
lead to microbursts of support around the country.146 For the first time, 
governors and mayors of cities were directing their clerks to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.147 While the Windsor case said 
nothing about state regulation over same-sex marriage, it opened the 
floodgates for plaintiffs to bring litigation claiming that a given state 
lacked authority to regulate their right to marry a person of the same 
sex.148 In the six months directly following the Windsor decision, courts 
were flooded with litigation over the newly unconstitutional DOMA.149 
Bassett v. Snyder was the first case to cite Windsor.150 In Bassett, the 
court found a Michigan law banning public employers from providing 
benefits to non-spouse partners was worthy of a preliminary 
injunction.151 In Ohio, Jim Obergefell filed suit for state recognition of 
his marriage.152 In New Jersey and New Mexico, courts struck down 
same-sex marriage bans,153 and many district courts followed.154 
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Circuit courts began to issue decisions on same-sex marriage 
recognition.155 The Tenth Circuit ruled same-sex marriage bans were 
unconstitutional in Kitchen v. Hebert.156 The Fourth Circuit followed 
suit.157 In September 2014, the rush of legal recognition for same-sex 
marriage hit a road bump in the Louisiana case Robicheaux v. Caldwell 
as the court found a same-sex marriage ban constitutional.158 On several 
occasions, LGBTQ activist groups appealed to the Supreme Court to 
consider their cases, but the Supreme Court remained removed from the 
discussion, claiming it would not hear any cases regarding the issue 
unless there was a circuit split.159 The Sixth Circuit created the long-
awaited circuit split when it ruled that same-sex marriage bans were 
constitutional in what would come to be known as the seminal case 
Obergefell v. Hodges.160 
IV. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES AND ITS AFTERMATH 
A. Obergefell v. Hodges and State Reactions 
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment required states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples.161 It found so because the fundamental liberties outlined within 
the Constitution help citizens “define and express their identity,” and 
the Fourteenth Amendment ensures all citizens enjoy those liberties.162 
Fourteen same-sex couples and two men with deceased partners brought 
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suit against government officials refusing to recognize the validity of 
their choice to marry a person of the same sex.163 They claimed this was 
a violation of both their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and 
Due Process rights.164 The couples initially filed suit in their home 
district courts and were successful.165 However, the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in DeBoer v. Snyder reversed all of the previous decisions 
by finding the Constitution does not require states to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples or even recognize same-sex marriages 
from other states.166 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court to 
review these decisions.167 The Supreme Court effectively expanded the 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that a person 
cannot be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”168 As a result, the Court found that people have the right to choose 
whom they marry, regardless of sex, as a part of their individual 
autonomy, thus reversing the Sixth Circuit’s decision.169 
Obergefell set off a firestorm of political opinion as leaders around 
the country praised or lamented the decision.170 Attorney General Ken 
Paxton of Texas was amongst those allegedly aggrieved by the ruling.171 
He stated, “the United States Supreme Court again ignored the text and 
spirit of the Constitution to manufacture a right that simply does not 
exist.”172 He claimed the Justices acted detrimentally to the 
Constitution.173 He further argued that the Supreme Court weakened the 
words of the Constitution, and thus weakened the law.174 Paxton 
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lamented this fact, but also used the ruling as a battle cry for religious 
liberty.175 
Ken Paxton proclaimed the essential problem of Obergefell is that 
public officials need guidance on how to implement the ruling while 
remaining loyal to the core tenets of their faith.176 He claimed public 
officials’ dual duties to their faith and the principles of the Constitution 
were now in conflict, and many were lost as to what to do regarding its 
implementation.177 Texas officials came to the solution that clerks and 
other public officials had the ability to seek accommodations for their 
religious beliefs regarding same-sex marriages.178 Further, Paxton 
determined that justices of the peace and judges were under no 
obligation to conduct same-sex wedding ceremonies when they felt that 
their religious beliefs prevented them from so doing.179 
Moreover, Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore told 
the probate judges not to issue any marriage licenses.180 The Alabama 
Supreme Court supported this notion by issuing a writ of mandamus 
suspending the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples for 
twenty-five days.181 The Court of the Judiciary ultimately suspended 
Chief Justice Roy Moore for the remainder of his term ending in 
2019.182 Additionally, Louisiana refused to issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples for either twenty-five days or until the Supreme Court 
issued a mandate requiring them to do so.183 Louisiana officials believed 
the Obergefell ruling took away a right that should have been left for 
the states to resolve.184 
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B. The Case Analysis of Miller v. Davis 
April Miller and Karen Roberts wanted to celebrate their eleven-
year relationship by getting married, and after the Obergefell decision 
they could do so in their home state of Kentucky.185 The couple tried 
marrying twice before but was denied a marriage license on both 
occasions.186 On their third visit to the Rowan County Clerk’s office 
following the Obergefell decision, they were denied again.187 
Additionally, another same-sex and two heterosexual couples were 
denied marriage licenses.188 Following Obergefell, Kim Davis, head 
clerk of Rowan County Clerk’s office announced that Rowan County 
would not issue marriage licenses to any couples.189 Together, the four 
couples filed an injunction in the District Court of Kentucky to enjoin 
Davis from enforcing her personal marriage license policy as it was in 
violation of the law.190 
In implementing this policy, Davis claimed she was protecting her 
right of freely exercising her religion as an Apostolic Christian.191 In 
furtherance of her policy, Davis did not allow any clerks to authorize 
marriage licenses because her name was on the document.192 Same-sex 
marriage was contrary to her Apostolic Christian beliefs, and she feared 
that having her name on marriage licenses for same-sex couples would 
be viewed as her endorsement of the practice.193 She argued there was 
an available alternative for couples because they could obtain marriage 
licenses from Rowan County Judge Executive Blevins.194 However, 
when couples attempted to get marriage licenses from Blevins, he was 
unable to do so as the law only permits him to issue marriage licenses 
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when the elected county clerk is absent.195 Since Davis was still 
performing other aspects of her position, she could not be deemed 
absent, thus Blevins could not issue marriage licenses.196 
Governor Beshear of Kentucky foresaw religion being a concern 
with regards to the Obergefell decision.197 In acknowledgment of this 
he stated: 
You can continue to have your own personal beliefs but, 
you’re also taking an oath to fulfill the duties prescribed 
by law, and if you are at that point to where your 
personal convictions tell you that you simply cannot 
fulfill your duties that you were elected to do, th[e]n 
obviously an honorable course to take is to resign and 
let someone else step in who feels that they can fulfill 
those duties.198 
According to Governor Beshear, Kim Davis did not take the honorable 
course because she did not resign.199 She remained in her position and 
continued to refuse to fulfill all the duties of her position.200 
The Obergefell decision and the reaction of Kim Davis formed the 
basis of a widespread concern.201 For instance, 57 out of the 120 clerks 
in Kentucky were of the same religion as Davis.202 The court needed to 
consider the possible ramifications that might occur if it granted Davis 
the right to excuse herself from executing marriage licenses.203 There 
was a potential for a snowball effect — the fifty-seven clerks who were 
of the same religious belief as Davis may follow her in asking for a 
religious exemption if the court granted her plea for an exemption from 
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.204 The court had to make 
a decision as the potential for damage to same-sex couples was 
exponential.205 
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District Court Judge David Bunning found Davis in contempt of 
court, and as a result she was jailed for five days.206 In April 2016, 
Governor Matt Blevin signed into law a statute that allowed clerks to 
remove their names from marriage licenses, and as such Davis asked the 
Sixth Circuit to dismiss her appeal.207 
C. Exemption for Reasons of Religious Belief 
A law in and of itself may not be a violation of the Establishment or 
the Free Exercise Clauses, but a law may still be offensive to an 
individual’s religious beliefs.208 Exemptions allow an individual to be 
excluded from the enforcement of or obligations imposed by the law if 
they successfully present a need for one based on religious beliefs.209 In 
Sherbert v. Verner, a seven-day Adventist was denied unemployment 
benefits because she refused to work on Saturdays, citing religious 
beliefs as the reason for her absence.210 The Court held she was 
exempted from the law.211 Exemptions can only occur when two 
circumstances are present.212 The first circumstance is the law is 
burdensome on a person’s free exercise of religion.213 The second 
circumstance is there is a substantial state interest served by the 
infringement on a person’s religious beliefs.214 To override a person’s 
religious belief the state interest must be of the upmost importance.215 
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The flaw with this test is that there is no defined limit on what qualifies 
as a person’s religious belief and what they can claim as such in order 
to be exempted from a particular law.216 The potential for abusing 
exemptions is great if one uses the exemption test as a tool to escape the 
provisions or effects of all laws.217 
Further, the exemption test does not directly address government 
officials and whether they can be exempted from performing official 
duties they believe are contrary to their religious beliefs.218 Government 
officials, whether elected or appointed, are to serve the general 
public.219 If they were to claim an exemption from performing a portion 
of their job, it would create a hazardous precedent because they are 
failing to serve a portion of the public for whom they were elected or 
appointed to serve.220 Moreover, there is the problem with a potential 
snowball effect.221 If one clerk is allowed to refrain from issuing 
marriage licenses, then how many others will follow suit?222 How would 
a potential snowball effect influence other areas of law in which there 
may be conflicts between law and religion?223 How would this affect 
other public officials and service providers such as hospitals or 
shelters?224 
V. PRESCRIPTIVE BALANCING TEST 
The complexity of Miller v. Davis demonstrates the need for a clear 
test to determine when government officials can be exempted from 
performing their public duties citing religious reasons.225 Below are 
several factors to be included in a balancing test concerning occasions 
where government officials could be exempted from issuing marriage 
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licenses to same-sex couples based on religious objections.226 These 
factors include: the accessibility of alternatives; denial of the benefits of 
marriage; irreparable harm to the plaintiffs; whether the official is 
elected or appointed; harm to government officials; and the feasibility 
of exemption. 
A. Accessibility of Alternatives 
When there are reasonable alternatives available to a party seeking 
a service that a government official is unwilling to provide based on 
personal religious beliefs, this may be an argument for the government 
official’s exemption from providing the service they find offensive.227 
Kim Davis argued there were multiple reasonable alternatives to getting 
a marriage license issued from the Rowan County Clerk’s office.228 
These options included obtaining a marriage license from one of the 
other seven local county clerks offices, going to the Rowan County 
Judge Executive or other alternative methods that may be determined.229 
There are numerous apparent issues with these suggested alternative 
options for same-sex couples. For example, there are several challenges 
with finding alternative locations to get a marriage license.230 The first 
challenge is transportation.231 Transportation to an alternate location 
may not be convenient or feasible for some couples.232 Furthermore, 
there are additional financial costs associated with finding an alternative 
location such as public transportation costs or gas.233 While there are 
available alternatives in the form of other counties, these counties are 
not the county in which the couple lives.234 The couple may have strong 
social ties to a particular community, and it may hold greater 
sentimental value to be married in that community.235 Moreover, same-
sex couples argue that they pay taxes in a particular community and, 
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therefore, they have the right to exercise their federally endowed rights 
in the same community.236 
In addition to alternative locations, there also must be alternative 
public officials available to perform civil unions and issue marriage 
licenses when a government official claims they should be exempted 
from issuing marriage licenses.237 The test must account for the 
possibility that clerks in surrounding counties may also express 
religious condemnation of the law, and refuse to issue marriage 
licenses.238 If this were the case, the available alternatives would be 
severely limited if available at all.239 For instance, there are 120 clerks 
in Kentucky, and 57 clerks who expressed religious condemnation of 
the Obergefell decision, calling for Governor Beshear to hold a special 
session of the legislature to discuss the religious implications of the 
decision.240 The fact that so many clerks expressed religious beliefs in 
conflict with the Obergefell decision presents the potential for a 
disastrous domino effect of prohibiting same-sex couples from 
exercising their newly guaranteed right to marry.241 If Davis were 
exempted from issuing marriage licenses, then the fifty-seven other 
clerks who expressed religious opposition of same-sex marriage might 
also claim that they should be exempted, which means nearly half of the 
officials elected or appointed to issue marriage licenses would refuse to 
issue them to an entire class of people.242 This exponentially decreases 
the number of potential alternative clerks available to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.243 
Moreover, the District Court of Eastern Kentucky dismissed as 
infeasible Davis’s claim that the Rowan County Judge Executive could 
issue marriage licenses instead.244 The local statute allows the Judge 
Executive to issue marriage licenses only in the absence of the county 
clerk which, as previously stated, was inapplicable since Davis was 
continuing in her other public duties.245 Additionally, if the Judge 
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Executive were to assume this as part of his or her duties, he or she 
would be excessively burdened, and it would exceed the scope of his or 
her employment.246 
B. Denial of Benefits of Marriage 
Courts must incorporate into their analysis all the state and federal 
benefits denied to same-sex couples when they are not permitted to 
obtain a marriage license.247 The denial of marriage licenses is not just 
a denial of a document; it is a denial of many rights entitled to married 
couples.248 Further, the denial of marriage licenses prevents same-sex 
partners from making medical decisions for each other in cases where 
one partner is incapacitated.249 As of December 31, 2003, following the 
Windsor decision declaring DOMA unconstitutional, the United States 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) identified 1,138 benefits 
within federal statutes where marriage is a factor in determining 
eligibility for those benefits.250 
The GAO extrapolated thirteen areas in which marital status is a 
factor in determining eligibility for benefits and privileges.251 These 
areas include: (1) Social Security and Related Programs, Housing and 
Food Stamps; (2) Veteran’s Benefits; (3) Taxation; (4) Federal Civilian 
and Military Service Benefits; (5) Employment Benefits and Related 
Statutory Benefits; (6) Immigration, Naturalization, and Aliens; (7) 
Indians; (8) Trade, Commerce, and Intellectual Property; (9) Financial 
Disclosure and Conflict of Interest; (10) Crimes and Family Violence; 
(11) Loans, Guarantees, and Payments in Agriculture; (12) Federal 
Natural Resources and Related Statutory Provisions; and (13) 
Miscellaneous Statutory Provisions.252 These designated areas clearly 
cover a broad range of benefits that impact almost every aspect of one’s 
                                                 
246 See id. 
247 See generally 36 AM. JUR. 2d Proof of Facts 441 (1983). The denial of marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples hinders custody and adoption proceedings. Id. 
248 Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, 
to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, (Jan. 23, 2004), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/92441.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6CT-9383]. 
249 See id. The ability to make medical decisions for one’s partner became 
increasingly important as more information came to light regarding HIV/AIDS; 
see KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 18. 
250 See Letter from Dayna K. Shah to Bill Frist, supra note 248. 
251 See id. 
252 See id. 
2018 Going to the Clerk's Office 129 
life, and have the potential to significantly improve the quality of life 
for one and one’s spouse. 
Some of the most critical benefits of married couples are those 
related to healthcare and medical surrogacy.253 Marriage allows spousal 
access to each partner’s health insurance plan.254 Marriage also allows 
people to act as medical decision-makers in cases where one spouse is 
incapacitated.255 In the case In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski, 
Karen Thompson, Sharon Kowalski’s partner, challenged the trial 
court’s decision to appoint Kowalski’s father as her guardian after 
Kowalski was injured in a car accident that left her paralyzed and unable 
to speak.256 Kowalski and Thompson had been cohabitating for four 
years.257 Further, they were each other’s insurance beneficiaries, and 
had exchanged rings.258 Initially, Thompson set aside her petition for 
guardianship with the understanding that Kowalski’s father would allow 
her to be part of the decision-making process.259 Kowalski’s father 
subsequently got a court order terminating Thompson’s visitation 
rights.260 After some time, the court ruled Kowalski competent enough 
to honor her request to visit with Thompson, her partner.261 Kowalski’s 
father relinquished his claim of guardianship, and Thompson petitioned 
for guardianship.262 Thompson’s petition was denied in favor of a 
Kowalski family friend.263 On appeal, the court found Thompson 
suitable to act as guardian to Kowalski.264 This case demonstrates how 
important medical surrogacy is to married couples as oftentimes one’s 
spouse has the most information about the current physical condition of 
their spouse, and what is best for them.265 
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Furthermore, social security is another benefit where marriage plays 
a factor in one’s eligibility.266 Following Windsor’s finding that DOMA 
was unconstitutional, same-sex couples in states where same-sex 
marriages were recognized became eligible for spousal social security 
benefits.267 Upon the ruling in Obergefell on June 26, 2015, the Social 
Security Administration recognized all same-sex marriages, and 
acknowledged their eligibility for spousal benefits.268 
In denying same-sex couples marriage licenses, they are denied 
hundreds of rights.269 It is important to balance all that is being denied 
to a same-sex couple when they are denied a marriage license with the 
hardship faced by a government official who has a religious objection 
to the Obergefell decision.270 People get married because they love one 
another, and with that comes an intimate knowledge of one’s spouse, 
which places them in the best position to make decisions for one 
another.271 To deny same-sex couples the benefits of marriage is to deny 
the couple their most knowledgeable decision-maker if something 
should happen to the other.272 It is to deny the spouse estate and tax 
benefits.273 It is to deny the spouse over 1,138 federal benefits obtained 
through marriage.274 
C. Irreparable Harm to the Plaintiffs - Fourteenth 
Amendment Right Denial 
A party will suffer irreparable harm when they are deprived of a 
constitutional right.275 In cases where same-sex marriage licenses are 
denied, the Fourteenth Amendment may be implicated as it contains two 
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clauses applicable to marriage.276 These are the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses.277 The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
do not allow a state to make a law that, “deprive[s] any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”278 
The petitioners in Obergefell claimed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment is implicated in cases where same-sex marriage is 
denied.279 The petitioners asserted the argument made in Loving was 
analogous to their case, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment was 
applicable.280 The couple at the heart of Loving had violated Virginia’s 
anti-miscegenation laws by marrying members of a different race.281 
Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, legally 
married in Washington D.C.282 They moved to Virginia, where they 
were charged with violating that state’s interracial marriage statute.283 
The Lovings were sentenced to one year in jail, but their sentence was 
postponed for twenty-five years on the condition that they leave 
Virginia and not return together while still married.284 The couple 
moved to set aside the judgement claiming the interracial marriage ban 
was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses.285 The court found the statute was a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause because no government interest necessitates the 
facial discrimination that is evident in the Virginia statute.286 Further, 
the Virginia statute implicated the Lovings’ Due Process rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment because marriage is a fundamental personal 
right, and the Virginia statute was depriving the Lovings of that right.287 
The petitioners in Obergefell echoed the Fourteenth Amendment 
argument in Loving, asserting the Due Process and Equal Protection 
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Clauses applied to same-sex marriage.288 They claimed that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “Due Process Clause extend[s] to certain 
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including 
intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs.”289 The Court in 
Loving found a nexus between a person’s liberty and marriage, and 
petitioners in Obergefell claimed this notion should be extended to 
same-sex couples.290 Moreover, the petitioners in Obergefell argued that 
they were denied their Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment because they were denied rights that are granted to 
heterosexual couples similarly situated regarding marriage.291 The 
Obergefell decision made clear the Fourteenth Amendment applies to 
heterosexual marriages and same-sex marriages equally.292 The couple 
is being denied their Fourteenth Amendment Right when they are not 
permitted to get a marriage license.293 The Fourteenth Amendment right 
is inclusive of all people as evidenced by the language “any person.”294 
“Any person” includes homosexuals as well as heterosexuals.295 By this 
logic, individuals in same-sex marriages should be afforded the same 
rights as individuals in heterosexual marriages.296 
D. Elected or Appointed Government Officials 
Government officials are elected or appointed for the specific 
purpose of serving the public and generally have a variety duties that 
may affect the constitutionally guaranteed rights of other.297 What 
happens when an official cannot perform one of his or her duties for 
religious reasons? Does the official’s refusal to issue marriage licenses 
in accordance with her religious beliefs prevent her from performing her 
other duties?298 Generally, the answer to this question is no.299 In the 
case of Davis v. Miller, Kim Davis performed her other public duties 
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during the time she was not issuing marriage licenses.300 If officials are 
capable of continuing in their other duties, then an exemption from the 
specific duty of issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples may be 
tolerable.301 
Conversely, there is the concern that there must be someone else 
available to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples if the official 
were exempted from this duty.302 In cases where there are no officials 
available to perform the job, then an exemption would not be prudent.303 
North Carolina and Utah have developed models allowing for 
government officials who may harbor religious opposition to a certain 
duty to remain in their official capacity while not hindering the rights of 
a certain class of people.304 These models ensure that there are alternate 
officials capable of issuing marriage licenses and performing civil 
ceremonies for same-sex couples, while also providing the opportunity 
for those with religious objections to excuse themselves from that 
duty.305 
The North Carolina legislature passed §51-5.5, which deals with 
recusal of public officials.306 This statute allows magistrates to recuse 
themselves from performing marriage ceremonies if they have a 
“sincerely held religious objection.”307 Further, the statute allows for the 
assistant register of deeds and deputy registers of deeds to recuse 
themselves from issuing marriage licenses.308 However, the office must 
provide an alternative public official to perform civil ceremonies and 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.309 Moreover, Utah’s model 
ensures there will be a “willing” clerk available during business hours 
to solemnize any marriage.310 
The fact that all government officials take an oath to support the 
United States Constitution under Article VI must be taken into 
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consideration when determining whether an official should be exempted 
from a particular duty due to religious objections.311 Article VI states, 
“all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the 
several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution . . . .”312 Kim Davis’s actions violated her sworn oath to 
protect and defend the Constitution.313 Davis argued that she did not 
violate this oath because her requirement to issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples was a religious test, which was a violation of the Oath 
Clause of the Constitution.314 Article VI does include a provision 
stating, “[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to 
any Office or public Trust under the United States.”315 The religious test 
provision is generally applied to candidates for official positions, and 
not people already in their official capacities.316 If this principle were 
applied to Miller v. Davis, Kim Davis would not be able to claim a 
religious test violation.317 
E. Harm to Government Official 
Another factor of the balancing test involves a consideration of the 
potential harm to a government official in not granting an exemption 
based on sincerely-held religious beliefs. In issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples, Kim Davis claimed she was compromising her 
Apostolic Christian beliefs.318 Further, she claimed that her name 
appearing on all marriage licenses equated to an endorsement of the 
institution of same-sex marriage, and thus issuing these marriage 
licenses would be a violation of her First Amendment right of free 
speech.319 
Case precedent supports the idea that harm to the government 
official must be considered when determining if there was a free speech 
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violation.320 Connick v. Myers involved an assistant district attorney 
whose employment was abruptly terminated for allegedly exercising her 
constitutional right to free speech.321 The assistant district attorney was 
given a transfer with which she was unhappy, and in turn she distributed 
a questionnaire measuring her co-workers’ support of supervisors and 
the transfer policy.322 She was ultimately terminated for refusing her 
transfer.323 She then brought suit claiming she was fired because she 
exercised her right of free speech in distributing her questionnaire.324 
To determine whether an official’s right to free speech has been 
violated, the court must balance the rights of the official as a citizen 
versus the state’s need to promote efficiency of the public services its 
employees perform.325 Further, the court must look at the official’s 
speech with regards to “content, form and context.”326 The court found 
the assistant district attorney’s First Amendment right of free speech had 
not been violated because she was not expressing an issue of public 
concern, but rather one of personal concern over her transfer.327 A court 
would most likely dismiss Davis’s Free Speech violation claim under 
the Myers standard.328 Davis does have the right to free speech, and that 
right may be impeded by the fact that her name appears on all marriage 
licenses in her county.329 However, this would most likely be 
outweighed by the state’s need to promote efficiency of the public 
service its employees perform in issuing marriage licenses.330 
Davis’s policy of not issuing any marriage licenses was an 
inefficient response to Obergefell in that it deprived the public of the 
official duties of the clerk’s office to which they were legally entitled.331 
Additionally, this efficiency consideration impacts many of the factors 
previously noted in this comment, such as availability of alternatives 
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and denial of benefits.332 By refusing to issue marriage licenses out of 
the Rowan County Clerk’s Office, she forced couples to travel to 
alternate locations, which may have been burdensome or infeasible. 
Further, her actions deprived people of the numerous tangible benefits 
attached to marriage.333 
F. Exemption: Compelling Interest Requirement 
For a government official to be exempted based on religious 
objections they must express a compelling interest.334 In Miller v. Davis, 
Davis said her compelling interest was the protection of her own 
religious freedom.335 While the state does have an interest in allowing 
the free exercise of religion, it also has an interest in preventing the 
imposition of religion on others.336 Davis imposed her religion on others 
by refusing to issue marriage licenses to anyone, and by further 
forbidding any of her fellow clerks to issue licenses in her stead.337 The 
court was unpersuaded by the personal interest Davis claimed.338 
Furthermore, Davis’s policy hindered the state interests of 
efficiency and applying the law evenly.339 Her failure to abide by the 
Obergefell decision was neither efficient nor an even application of the 
law.340 The court found that Davis’s policy in the Rowan County 
Clerk’s office served no compelling state interest.341 Supreme Court 
decisions are due deference and respect.342 By not abiding by the law 
set forth in Obergefell, Davis created a dangerous precedent with 
potentially disastrous consequences.343 
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VI. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND 
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
Denied . . . 
Because two civil liberties are in conflict . . .344 
And no one knows which will win or if both will lose.345 
No one won in Miller v. Davis.346 Yes, April Miller and Karen 
Roberts got married.347 Yes, Kim Davis had her name removed from all 
marriage licenses issued out of the Rowan County Clerk’s Office.348 
However, these small victories in the battle for same-sex marriage 
highlight an even bigger problem.349 Kim Davis is one of many who 
expressed religious objections to the Obergefell decision.350 What if all 
of those who expressed religious objections claimed they too could not 
issue marriage licenses?351 All it would take is a slight change in the 
political climate or one charismatic believer to act as a martyr in the 
opposition to same-sex marriage to cause the tenuous walls created by 
the Obergefell decision to come crumbling down.352 What occurred in 
Miller v. Davis was a bandage; it was not a solution.353 
Government officials know what their duties are, and they should 
resign if they cannot perform those duties.354 Religious exemption from 
enforcing or abiding by a law should come with a strict standard for 
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government officials.355 The balancing test described above provides a 
framework for this standard.356 Additionally, sexual orientation should 
be a protected class. If sexual orientation were a protected class, there 
would be redress available against those who discriminate based on 
sexual orientation.357 This would add teeth to the suggested balancing 
test above because it elevates sexual orientation to the same level as that 
of a protected class. The Supreme Court must decide this issue. On April 
4, 2017, the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College 
of Indiana ruled that discrimination based on sexual orientation was 
against the Civil Rights Act of 1864 in an 8-3 decision.358 This may be 
the very impetus the Supreme Court needs to weigh in on the issue of 
whether sexual orientation qualifies as a protected class.359 When two 
civil liberties battle, “no one knows which will win or if both will 
lose.”360 Until the court applies a stricter standard for religious 
exemptions to government officials, no one will win.361 
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